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Previewsor discrete representations of the rele-
vant variables. However, while machine-
learning algorithms do exist to segment
arbitrary signals, such as the movements
of honeybees or fruit flies, into statistically
differentiated dynamical regimes (Fox
et al., 2009; Berman et al., 2014), these
techniques are often only useful when
segments are already identifiable by eye
and one simply seeks to automate the
segmentation process. Ideally, one would
like to learn reduced representations of
two or more predictively linked variables
(e.g., stimulus and behavior) simulta-
neously. One such ‘‘dual dimensionality
reduction,’’ based on the method of par-
tial least-squares, a variant of cross-cor-
relation analysis, was recently used to
identify coding principles involved in con-
trol of flight muscles in the hawkmoth
(Sponberg et al., 2015). Other ‘‘dual’’
methods of simultaneously identifying
simple representations of both input and
output, such as coclustering (Dhillon
et al., 2003), may also prove useful in the
analysis of future data sets. Indeed, such1128 Neuron 87, September 23, 2015 ª2015an analysis may reveal that the walking
trajectories of female flies during court-
ship are best described not as sequences
of speeds but rather as song-feature-
dependent transitions among a discrete
set of movement states, as is observed
in male ‘‘dances’’ during courtship
(Spieth, 1974). The recent work of Clem-
ens et al. (2015) provides great encour-
agement that the neural substrates that
govern such sensory-driven decisions
will be decodable.
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Real-life decisions often involve multiple intermediate choices among competing, interdependent options.
Lorteije et al. (2015) introduce a new paradigm for dissecting the neural strategies underlying such decisions.Decisions in the laboratory typically require
a single choice, between two or more
options. But in real life, decisions are often
hierarchical, requiring multiple choices
that define a path through a decision tree.
Hierarchical decisions can be made with
an explicitly serial strategy—choosing
one of the highest-level branches first,
then moving on to lower-level decisions
within that branch. This happens, for
example, when we use a phone app to
choose a restaurant by picking a neighbor-
hood first, then choosing a cuisine avail-
able in that neighborhood, then a pricepoint within the range for that cuisine, etc.
(Figure 1A, ‘‘Serial’’). The serial strategy
saves time and effort—at each choice
point, we eliminate the need to consider
anything further down the non-chosen
branches.
But what happens if we make a more
rapid and intuitive decision about where
to eat? The decision is certainly influ-
enced by the same interacting factors—
where we feel like traveling, what we feel
like eating, how much we want to spend.
Our internal decision-making process
could follow the same steps, deciding ona neighborhood first, then a cuisine, etc.
But that sounds a bit clunky and suspi-
ciously digital. Shouldn’t our extremely
parallel wetware use a more parallel
strategy? Maybe our brains should
compare all restaurants at once, rating
each based on a combination of neigh-
borhood, cuisine, and price. This amounts
to evaluating all possible paths through
the decision tree in parallel (Figure 1B,
‘‘Parallel Path’’). It might work, if we only
know a few restaurants. But most of us
know dozens at least, and comparing
them all simultaneously would be a tall
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Figure 1. Hierarchical Decision Strategies
(A) In a serial strategy, choice points are evaluated in descending order. Higher-level choices narrow the
range of options at lower levels.
(B) In a parallel path strategy, each endpoint and thus each path is evaluated at the same time, based on its
values at each choice point.
(C) In a parallel choice strategy, each choice point is evaluated at the same time. Emerging choices can
inhibit unrelated branches.
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Previewsorder. This strategy is too resource inten-
sive, because it fails to take advantage of
the decision tree structure to eliminate
some of the work.
In this issue of Neuron, Lorteije et al.
(2015) show that the primate brain can
use a third, more efficient strategy: pro-
cessing choices, not paths, in parallel
(Figure 1C, ‘‘Parallel Choice’’). This is
like thinking simultaneously about which
neighborhood we prefer, what cuisine
we want, and how much we have to
spend and integrating those choices as
they develop to find the path through
the decision tree—the restaurant—that
makes us happiest. This strategy is paral-
lel to a more reasonable degree, since the
number of choice points is much smaller
than the total number of restaurants.
And, it can take advantage of the decision
tree structure, since it can use developing
choices to shut down other choice pro-
cesses as they become irrelevant. For
example, as we decide that we can only
spend $20, we can stop worrying about
whether to have 5-course French cuisine.
Lorteije et al. (2015) trained macaque
monkeys on a visual version of a hierarchi-cal decision task (Figure 2A). Here, the de-
cision tree was quite literal, beginning at
the fixation point (green) and descending
through three branch points along four
possible paths, each ending with an eye
movement target at the bottom. Near the
branch points, the brightnesses of the
two branches fluctuated stochastically
(and independently) around different
base luminances, at a rate of 20 times
per second. The correct eye movement
target was at the end of the path with
the brightest branches at choice points
L1 and L2. (The monkey was rewarded
for shifting gaze to the correct target after
fixating for 500 ms.) The L20 choice point,
below the dimmer L1 branch, was techni-
cally irrelevant, but the monkey could not
know which lower branch point was L20
until the L1 choice was solved.
The stochastic fluctuations in bright-
ness allowed the authors to analyze,
across many trials (including error trials),
howmuch decisions depended on bright-
ness at different time points, since some
fluctuations add evidence for the correct
decision while others favor an incorrect
decision. For L1, as expected, the earliestNeuron 87, Septime points had the greatest effect on de-
cisions, and the effects gradually waned
over the course of about 300 ms. If the
decision strategy were sequential, then
L2 decisions should have been more
affected by later time points. Remarkably,
however, the L1 and L2 time courses were
identical, suggesting that the two branch
points were processed entirely in parallel.
This seems to rule out the serial strategy,
at least under the specific circumstances
of this task. (You could hypothesize that
L1 and L2 were processed serially but in
random order; however, the extra delay
in evidence accumulation this would pro-
duce was not observed.)
What about the parallel path strategy?
The behavioral evidence went against
this as well. If all four paths were consid-
ered separately, on the combined basis
of their L1 plus L2 or L20 brightness, then
exceptionally bright L20 branches should
attract incorrect choices, in effect biasing
the choice at L1. However, no such bias
was observed. Thus, the behavioral evi-
dence was most consistent with the par-
allel choice strategy, in which L1 process-
ing ultimately damped the effect of L20
information.
Of course, the reason for doing this
experiment in monkeys, not humans,
was to examine processing not just at
the behavioral level but at the neural level
as well. The authors recorded multi-unit
activity from visual areas V1 and V4.
These areas are not closely associated
with decision-making in the same way
as parietal or prefrontal cortex. But the
well-defined visuotopic receptive fields
in these areas made it possible to
examine processing of different display
regions in isolation. Specifically, the au-
thors focused on multi-unit receptive
fields encompassing the constant bright-
ness line segments connecting the
branch points to each other and to the
targets (Figures 2B and 2C), so that
response levels would reflect internal pro-
cessing strength rather than external vi-
sual excitation.
For each branch point, the critical com-
parison was between activity on target
versus distractor branches. Stronger re-
sponses to the identical, static brightness
line segment when it was on the target
branch (Figure 2B) must reflect the deci-
sion process in some way. This would
not mean that decisions originate fromtember 23, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1129
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Figure 2. Hierarchical Decision Task
(A) Lorteije et al. (2015) trained monkeys to fixate on a spot (green dot) while evaluating which of four paths
had the brighter branch at choice point L1 and at choice point L2. After the 500 ms fixation period, the
monkey received a reward for shifting gaze to the target (white circle) at the end of that path. In this
example, the correct gaze shift is indicated by the dashed arrow.
(B) In multi-unit neural recording experiments in V1 and V4, the display was arranged so that one of the
constant brightness connecting segments passed through the receptive field region (orange circle). In this
example, the receptive field is on the target path.
(C) In this example, brightnesses at the L2 choice point are reversed, so the same receptive field is now on
a distractor path.
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PreviewsV1 or V4, only that sensory cortex reflects
feedback from higher-level decision pro-
cesses. But such attention-like modula-
tion could be part of the decision process.
Juicing up relevant inputs and throttling
back irrelevant inputs could make deci-
sion-making at higher levels faster and/
or more accurate.
Indeed, V1 and especially V4 multi-
unit populations exhibited stronger re-
sponses when the line segment in their
receptive field was on the target branch.
The difference between target and dis-
tractor branch responses emerged 150–
200 ms after stimulus onset, well after
initial visual responses, consistent with
feedback modulation. These activity dif-
ferences were even predictive of errors:
on trials where the distractor segment
was erroneously chosen, responses to
the distractor segment were stronger
than responses to the target segment.
This is clear evidence of a relationship to
the decision-making process.
The timing and strengths of target/dis-
tractor response differences were consis-
tent with a parallel choice strategy. The
differences developed in parallel, with
similar strengths, for L1 and L2 branches,
again seeming to rule out a serial decision
strategy. In fact, for a brief period, the dif-
ference at the L20 branch also developed
in parallel, which a strictly serial model
would never predict. A parallel path strat-
egy would dictate that L20 processing
continue through the entire decision pro-
cess. But beyond200 ms, the L20 differ-
ence remained small, while the L1 and L2
differences continued to grow. This is1130 Neuron 87, September 23, 2015 ª2015consistent with a parallel choice strategy,
in which developing information at L1
leads to suppressed processing at the
irrelevant L20 choice point.
This paper is an exciting first approach
to neural choice strategies in complex,
hierarchical, stochastic decision spaces
like those we face in the real world. The
behavioral and neural results are fascinat-
ingly suggestive and should motivate
many future studies linking to the existing
decision literature. An obvious target
would be frontal and parietal areas that
implement decision-making, eye move-
ments, and attentional shifts and exert
feedback influences on V4 and other parts
of visual cortex (Gold and Shadlen, 2007;
Noudoost et al., 2010; So and Stuphorn,
2010; Mante et al., 2013). Many neurons
in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, supple-
mentary and frontal eye fields, and lateral
intraparietal cortex have spatially local-
ized receptive fields amenable to this
task design. Path-related activity in a
maze task has been observed in dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (Mushiake et al.,
2006).
It will be critical to apply the powerful
experimental and analytical tools, in-
cluding psychometric/neurometric ana-
lyses and micro-stimulation, that have
been used to establish causal relation-
ships between neural activity and deci-
sions (Parker and Newsome, 1998; Gold
and Shadlen, 2007; Salzman et al., 1992;
Ditterich et al., 2003; Stuphorn and Schall,
2006). Previous work on competitive
accumulation models (Gold and Shadlen,
2007) is particularly relevant to the paral-Elsevier Inc.lel, interactive model suggested here by
Lorteije et al. (2015). Measurements of
confidence (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009)
might also be a powerful probe for inter-
mediate decision stages. Finally, it will
be important to examine how decision
strategies evolve with task learning. Early
learning stages may implement more
deliberate, serial strategies (Dehaene
and Sigman, 2012; Donoso et al., 2014)
that are only automatized into parallel
mechanisms after extensive experience.
It is widely appreciated that perceptual
neuroscience must address naturalistic
complexity in order to truly understand
how the brain interacts with the real world.
The same principle applies to decision-
making, which typically takes places un-
der complex circumstances with interact-
ing contingencies, both perceptual and
economic (Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
The new study by Lorteije et al. (2015) is
a promising step in this direction.
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